It is usually suggested that the three great sources of our law are case law (in the sense of the " common " law), equity, and legislation, and that, historically, this is the order of their coming; first the common law, then equity, then parliamentary legislation. But, though it contains truth, such a view is too simple. It is too commonly imagined that the common law relates to something in the past which has yielded place, under the strain of modern conditions, to a much more rapid and efficient system of law making by parliament and executive. In fact, on the one hand, the common law is still with us-still creatively with us-and on the other, legislation has had a decisive influence in certain fields for seven hundred to eight hundred years. Indeed, as has been pointed out by Ilbert (1901) 1 " There have been three great constructive periods of English Legislation-the Edwardian period, which laid the foundations of our political and judicial institutions; the Tudor period, which came after the close of feudalism and at the beginning of the 'new monarchy', which strove to give effect to the ideas of the Renascence and Reformation, which dealt vigorously and unsparingly with the mediaeval church, and undertook the responsibility of discharging, through the secular state, functions which had previously been considered to belong to the domain of the Church; and, lastly, the period which followed the Reform Act of 1832, and which, in some senses may be said to be continuing to-day."
And yet during these periods the common law was not uncreative either. In fact, from the lawyers' point of view there are two kinds of law, in one of which parliament has made itself preeminent and in the other the hold of the courts has been almost unchallenged. What is remarkable is not perhaps that the judge in his function of law maker should continue, but that his elasticity and adaptability should be so marked.
One of the first effects of the industrial revolution was to create a spate of legislation, though much of it was what we should now call local legislation: Acts, which empowered the building of bridges, canals, railways. Institutionally, there was no break in the barrenness which had persisted since the great reforms of the Tudors.2 But after 1832 the picture changed.
" Take up a volume ", says Ilbert, " of the eighteenth century Statutes and compare it with a volume of the Victorian period, and you will find yourself in a new world. In the eighteenth century there was no local Government Board, no Board of Education, no Board of Agriculture. . . Nor were there county councils, district councils, parish councils. The functions of the central and local authorities were comparatively few and simple ", and he goes on to add, " The net result of the legislative activity which has characterised . . . the period since 1832, has been the building up piecemeal of an administrative machine of great complexity, which stands in as constant need of repair, renewal, reconstruction and adaptation to new requirements as the plant of a modern factory. The legislation required for this purpose is enough, and more than enough, to absorb the whole legislative time of the House of Commons, and the problem of finding the requisite time for this class of legislation increases in difficulty every year." 3 Indeed Parliament in this third period of legislation has come full circle and we are in substance back to the practice of Parliament in the time of the first Edwards, in which the King by his ministers made the law. Parliament's absorption in activity of this kind was a matter of anxiety to common lawyers even before the turn of the century. Writing in 1895 Pollock thought that " the besetting danger of modern law is the tendency of complex fact and minute legislation to leave no room for natural growth, and to choke out the life of principles under a weight of dead matter which posterity might think no better than a rubbish heap." 4 Time has shown that this is too conservative a view both of the worth of much parliamentary legislation and of the growth of what has so often been called " lawyers' law ", the type of law, which speaking generally, arises from the activities of a judge applied to problems raised by litigation. For Parliament is still relatively little concerned with the rules of contract, tort, property, family relations, succession and inheritance, and the like. And within these fields the anvil of litigation is still extremely potent. Speaking generally, legislation is more usually a mirror of the evils of a society, of the defects from which it suffers, than the pattern of a new society, and the value of Parliament's activities is not so much in the field of creative law as in administrative regulation. From the historical point of view legislation is rather like the written Utopia, not necessarily a valuable guide to the future but a manifestation of the society which gave it birth. Somebody looking at the Bankruptcy Acts in series once remarked that they revealed the problem before Parliament as that of drawing a net narrow enough to catch the rogue but wide enough to let the unfortunate escape. The Factory Acts reveal the same process.
The first of these early efforts at factory legislation was hesitating and tentative in the extreme, even the name, " An Act for the Health and Morals of Apprentices and Others" indicating Parliament's reluctance to wander into the new fields. The Act was aimed at the old parish apprentice system and contained some humane features but was largely ineffective, for it was aimed at a system which had passed its zenith. The habit of employing parish children was yielding to the employment of " free children ", whose own parents often were a vested interest against reform, 'or about whom, since they were employed under a so-called voluntary contract, it was not nearly so easy to rouse public opinion. Other Acts were passed between then and 1833, Acts Lord Abinger felt that he had to decide the case on general principles, and was at liberty to look at the consequences one way or the other. Surveying them he was alarmed, for he found that if the master was liable, he would be liable for the negligence of all his 'inferior agents', e.g. to the footman for the negligence of his coachman; . . . to a domestic servant for the negligence of a chambermaid, the upholsterer, the cook, the butcher and the builder. A more remarkable medley of so called agents it is difficult to conceive. Faced with the absurdity of these consequences, the court concluded that the master is not bound to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do for himself" 8 Lord Wright went further when he said that "these instances seem to show personal apprehensions rather than any principle " 9.
Historically, the importance of Priestley v. Fowler was twofold. It originated the doctrine of " common employment ", an unhappy doctrine which laid Those words are, in fact, the origin of a code of rights and liabilities which have filled the legislative gaps to which reference has been made. A workman, it is said, must accept the hazards of working alongside his fellow workmen, but this is soon glossed by the courts and it is held that an employer will be liable to his workman for hazards arising from (a) his failure to select servants of competent care and skill, and (b) his failure to safeguard his servant from " unreasonable risks ".
The law begins to develop with some rapidity, in Scotland more so than in England, and it comes to be established that a master owes a personal duty of care towards his servant, and that this duty operates in respect of the place of work, the plant, and the machinery involved, and where the master delegates these duties to another, he will none the less remain responsible to that other. The story of these developments is fascinating in the extreme, but cannot be discussed here. It is sufficient to recall that faced with a situation in which the hazards of employment were increasing with great rapidity and with a Parliament which remained, on the whole, mute as to the rights of the individual workman, the courts built up a threefold obligation for the employer; namely, the obligation to provide a competent staff; the obligation to provide adequate equipment and material; and the obligation to fuse the two into what the law calls " a safe system of working", the latter proving a remarkably elastic and resilient concept by which the courts could secure justice for the injured workman. How 
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Co. Ltd.,'3 a tool setter, while making adjustments, removed from a power press the guard which had been fitted by the defendants and failed to replace it when testing the press in motion. It was held that he could not recover. The defendants in fitting a guard had provided a device for the plaintiff's safety which he was under an absolute statutory duty to use. He was therefore in breach of Section 119 of the Factories Act and damages awarded to him by the trial court must be reduced by one-fifth. There was some evidence that his employers had acquiesced in his working without a guard but this did not unmake the man's own offence. He had a duty independent of the employers for a breach of which he must be responsible in damages. Two other cases merit discussion. I choose them only because they show developments in principle. The first is of considerable interest, for in Paris v. Stepney Borough Council 14 the plaintiff, a garage hand who had already lost the sight of one eye, was blinded by a piece of metal which flew when he was attempting to knock a nut from a bolt. Mr. Justice Lynskey in the court of first instance held that the employers were negligent, but the Court of Appeal disagreed. The House of Lords found for the plaintiff, reinstating Mr. Justice Lynskey's decision, though varying the reasons. Mr. Justice Lynskey had said that since the employers were aware of the man's partial blindness, they should have provided goggles. The Court of Appeal, and particularly Lord Justice Asquith, felt that a distinction should be made between risks and consequences. The risks of accident to a partially blind man were not necessarily greater than those to a sighted man, though the consequences of accident were greater, and it was unfair to visit upon the employer those additional consequences. Certainly were it not for the Disabled Persons Act employers, after Paris's case, would have been reluctant to employ disabled persons, for they were increasing their own obligations when they did so.
In Paris's case the employer knew of the defect. What would be the position where the employer had no such knowledge? We had not long to await the answer. Last year the courts heard the case of a workman who was injured by falling from a platform twenty feet above ground level, which, contrary to the building regulations, was not 34 inches wide and did not contain the proper guard and toe rails. But the workman suffered from epilepsy and had been told by his doctors not to work above ground level. It was held that responsibility was equal, and the damages reducable 13. (1952 
